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Most Latin American countries treat business practices associ-
ated with market power and the competitive relations which
emerge and develop within the national economy differently than
restrictive practices which develop and operate in the context of
international economic relations. There has been a definitive,
though often implicit, tendency to distinguish between the treat-
ment of "domestic" and "imported" market power. Generally, di-
rect control of restrictive business practices through anti-monopoly
legislation has been of marginal significance. Judicial and adminis-
trative decisions have neither defined nor developed the concepts
of "market power" and "dominant position," and seldom have
such concepts served as a basis for governmental action. The anti-
monopoly laws of Latin America have been applied primarily as
instruments directly protecting consumers against specific price
rises rather than as devices for controlling market structures and
situations of concentrated economic power.
The inefficiency of Latin American anti-monopoly laws is due
principally to changing economic circumstances and priorities as
well as to insufficient enforcement of the existing laws. These laws
serve more as guidelines for the application of governmental poli-
cies rather than as a basis for direct governmental action. How-
ever, laws which encourage competition or directly control abusive
use of economic power may, in the future, result in certain changes
in the present developmental conditions in Latin America.
Laws pertaining directly to the control of market power have
been developed in the areas of price control, industrial promotion,
state enterprises, and industrial concentration. Although these
laws are not designed specifically to control restrictive business
practices, their scope and increased application indicate not only a
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present but potential regulatory impact on the formation and exer-
cise of market power. The Latin American countries have tended
to adopt a "pragmatic approach" to the existence of dominant
power of domestic enterprises. Control is essentially exercised only
when such power adversely affects national economic policies relat-
ing to autonomous development, social welfare, and industrial effi-
ciency. Governmental policies in Latin America regarding the con-
trol of international restrictive business practices are based on a
deliberate process of harmonizing legislation and existing policies
as well as a variety of approaches and procedures used in different
countries in the international community. The range of mecha-
nisms used reflects the government's awareness of the varying
types of restrictive practices and the search for appropriate meth-
ods of control through the system of learning by doing.
During the past decade, a majority of Latin American coun-
tries have enacted and enforced new laws for the regulation of for-
eign investment in their respective countries, with particular atten-
tion placed on the control of restrictive business practices.
Attention has also been given to the monopolistic consequences of
the influx of foreign capital on the control of take-overs of national
enterprises, on the regulation of access to foreign firms, and on the
domestic credit and industrial development incentives. Govern-
ments have the tendency to intervene directly in negotiations in-
volving foreign enterprises. A common feature of these laws is the
aim of controlling the dominant power of foreign enterprises
through the formation of mixed enterprises, consisting of domestic
(state and/or private) and foreign capital, thereby achieving do-
mestic control over the decision-making of such enterprises. Latin
American countries have placed specific emphasis on the search for
a new approach aimed at controlling the dominant power and
practices of transnational corporations in transfer pricing policies
and territorial market allocation arrangements. Some governments
have dealt with these two areas by exercising control of royalties
and intra-company loans. Most Latin-American countries prohibit
royalty payments between related enterprises on the theory that
these enterprises form only one "economic unit." Transnational
corporations are given minimum individual export levels in order
to control territorial market allocation arrangements. In addition,
eligibility for tax and other incentives is frequently linked to spe-
cific export commitments.
No systematic or self-contained policy aimed primarily at the
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over-all control of restrictive business practices exists in Latin
America. What could be termed as policies to control restrictive
business practices are essentially the "by-products" of a series of
governmental policies in a number of areas. Furthermore, "by-
products" do not always harmonize with one another, nor do they
collectively form a coordinated approach to the question of restric-
tive business practices. Which practices should be controlled or
how the best control can be effected is, in general, an open ques-
tion in the anti-monopoly field. Specifically, in the case of Latin
America, it is important to recognize the wide differences that exist
between the various countries regarding fundamental aspects of
their economies and institutions as well as their over all policies.'
Since the beginning of the industrialization process in Latin
America, and particularly since the emergence of import substitu-
tion policies, oligopolization, resulting in significant barriers to
competition and development in many sectors, has characterized
the national economic systems.2 In a majority of countries in Latin
America, a small group of enterprises control a large portion of to-
tal production. This has enabled these enterprises to determine the
behavior of the other small units, and has provided a wide field of
maneuverability for restrictive business practices through such de-
vices as buying and selling arrangements, and financial and techni-
cal assistance operations. In addition, the use of vertical restrictive
practices such as tied purchasing arrangements, resale price fixing,
and exclusivity agreements has been encouraged. The expansion of
large unity through diversification and capital centralization has
led to the formation of conglomerates involved in industrial activi-
ties, finance, trade, and commerce. The result has been an accumu-
lation of economic power.
During the early 1970's, the most important industrial sectors
in Latin America were largely controlled by foreign firms. Foreign
capital was invested mainly in the most dynamic branches of in-
dustry, reinforcing the oligopolistic structure of these industries.
The expansion of foreign subsidiaries frequently involved extensive
use of local financial resources. The objectives of the development
1. White, Control of Restrictive Business Practices in Latin America, UNCTAD ST/
MD/4 G.E. 75-45034 (1975) at v-xi.
2. Estudio de la Problemdtica Industrial de la Zona, ALALC/SEC/PA/17, reprinted in
102 SfNTHESIS MENSUAL 7 (1973); White, supra note 1, at 3; BD. OF CARTAGENA AGEMENT
& INT'L DEY. REsEARCH CENTER, ANDEAN PACT TECHNOLOGY POLICIS (1976), chaps I & II
[hereinafter cited as ANDEAN PACT TECH].
1982]
LAWYER OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 14
plans and industrial incentives based on the protection of "Infant
Industry" were distorted.' Global strategies of transnational corpo-
rations related to territorial production and marketing allocation
arrangements, pricing policies, and the use and movement of funds
have a vital impact on an affiliate's operations. In many Latin
American countries, the volume of intracompany transactions is
substantial and growing, especially in the importing and exporting
of manufactured products. It is in this area that the known cases of
abuses of economic power in the transfer pricing mechanism have
occurred.'
The following analysis of the Latin American laws of monopo-
lization, abuse of economic power, and competition includes criti-
cisms and conclusions concerning these laws.
II. ANTI-MONOPOLY LAWS
The constitutions and legal systems of Latin American coun-
tries prohibit both private monopolies and abuses of economic
power which tend to eliminate free competition.5 Several countries
do provide, however, for state created monopolies which serve na-
tional interests exclusively.
e
3. E. ANAYA, PERU Y LAs GwRmEs EMPRESAS MULNACIONALES (1974); Sauret, La
Denacionalizaci6n del Control de la Economfa Argentina y la Legislaci6n Antimonop6tio, 3
REVISTA DEL DHzcso COMEECiAL Y DR LAS OBLIGACIONES 349 (1970); White, supra note 1, at
6; ANDEAN PACT TECH., supra note 2, at 9.
4. A. Ruiz-EDRzDGz, LA CoNSrnciN ComrRADE (1979) at 277; ANDEAN PACT TECH.,
supra note 2, chap. I.
5. CoNsTrrcitN art. 10 (Argen. 1853); Law 22.262 of 1980; CoNSTuCi6N art. 134 (Bol.
1967); CoNsTrruicAo art. 157 (Braz. 1967); Law 4.137, 10 Sept. 1962; Law 1.521, 26 Dec.
1951; Decree Law 869, 18 Nov. 1938; Decree 52.025, 20 May 1963; CONSTITUCiON arts. 19-25
(Chile 1980); Decree Law 2.760 of 1979; Decree Law 211 of 1973; CoNs-rrrucl6N art. 31
(Colom. 1886, amended 1979); Law 155 of 1959; Decree 1302, 1 June 1964; CoNssrruc16N
(Costa Rica 1949); Law 18 of 9 June 1915; Law 2468 of 13 Nov. 1959; Constituci6n art. 45
(Ecuador 1978); CONSTrruCI6N art. 142 (El Salvador 1962); Decree 279, 12 Mar. 1969, art. 14;
Decree 2725, 6 Oct. 1958. COMMERCIAL CODE, (Guat.) arts. 361, 362, 663; CONSTTUcI6N art.
263 (Hand. 1965); Decree Law 91, 13 Nov. 1973, COMMRCIAL CODE art. 423; CONsTITuc16N
arts. 4, 5, 28 (Mex. 1917); Organic Law of 31 Aug. 1934; CoNsTrrucl6N art. 67 (Nicer. 1974);
Decree of 20 July 1979; CONSTrruci6N arts. 254, 257 (Pan. 1972); CoNsTrruc16N art. 95 (Para.
1967); CONSTrruci6N arts. 16, 40 (Peru 1979); Law of 11 Jan. 1896; CONSrITUC6N arts. 97,
100 (Venes. 1961). The above countries prohibit both private monopolies and abuses of eco-
nomic power which tend to eliminate free competition. All of the provisions of the Nicara-
guan Constitution are currently suspended.
6. CONsTrrucICN art. 134 (Bol. 1967); CONSnTrUCI6N art. 31 (Colom. 1886, amended
1979); Law 155 of 1959; Decree 1302, 1 June 1964; CONSTrMc16N art 263 (Hond. 1965);
Decree Law 91, 13 Nov. 1973; COMMERCLI CODE, art. 473; CoNserrucz6N art. 85, §§ 17, 50
(Uru. 1966); Law 9585 of 20 Aug. 1936. These countries provide for state-created monopo-
lies. Although the Honduran Constitution outlaws monopolies, it permits agreements, not to
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The "market power" concept is considered a specific prerequi-
site for state intervention only in the laws of Brazil, Mexico, and
Colombia. There are no precise criteria, however, for determining
the geographical and product markets, or for defining "market
domination" or "restrictive practice."'7 The laws govern only the
conduct of the dominant enterprises, rather than their structure.
Those monopolies regulated by the state because of the type of
activity in which the company engages, or because of a need to
control prices or industrial development in a given industry, are
generally excluded from the application of the anti-monopoly laws
in these countries. In order to enforce these laws, there must be
specific evidence of definite effects, market dominaton or suppres-
sion of free competition.
The new Argentine anti-monopoly law prevents, rather than
cures market monopolization, thereby improving the traditional
Latin American method of dealing with monopolies. 8 Argentine law
defines a "dominant position" as one held by a person who exclu-
sively offers or demands a particular product in the national mar-
ket. The law also refers to a "dominant position" when two or
more persons agree not to compete with each other, or with a third
party.' Monopolistic acts include price fixing, limiting or control-
ling technical development of production of goods or services, lim-
iting distribution, making exclusive rights tied to purchasing agree-
ments, fixing resale prices (either above or below cost), and
reducing production in order to increase prices. 10 The new Argen-
tine law provides the government with a flexible policy tool which
will allow it to react to changes in the market. The law provides for
a public agency to both study and repress monopolization and re-
strictive business practices." In Brazil, the law defines abuse of ec-
onomic power as domination of national markets, or a total or par-
exceed ten years, which restrict certain commercial activities to a particular region. The
Uruguayan Constitution recognizes the validity of monopolies by the state, departmental
governments, or private persons. In addition, the legislative branch of government has the
authority to grant monopolies. De facto monopolies such as trust cartels are under state
control.
7. C. CoimuA, EL DzmcHo LATINOAMERICANO Y LA PROPUESTA DE REGULACI6N INTERNA-
CIONAL DE LA TRANSFERENCIA DE TECHNOLOGIA; UN ANALISIS PRRLInINAR (1981) jhereinafter
cited as EL DERECHO LATINOAMERICANO].
8. Law 22.262 of 1980; Law 12.906 of 1946; Christensen, La Nueva Ley de Monopolio,
13 REVISTA DEL DERECHO CO CIMAL Y DE LAS OBLIGACIONFS 513 (1980).
9. Law 22.262, art. 2 of 1980.
10. Id. at art. 41.
11. Id. at arts. 6-10.
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tial elimination of competition. The key element in the Brazilian
law centers on whether an enterprise's activities have "a prepon-
derate influence on prices." An enterprise is presumed to be in a
dominant position when a number of firms cannot compete with it
in a given market. Monopoly activity, however, is only considered
abusive when prices are raised without justification.'2 Specifically
related to the laws on competition are those portions of the consti-
tution concerning cooperation and the relationship among business
enterprises. These provisions are aimed at preventing intention to
dominate certain sectors of the market, repression of competition,
arbitrary profit increases without corresponding production in-
creases, or price increases without justification. These actions and
any others should be prohibited when they are carried out with the
intention of abusing economic power.
13
Chile's new anti-monopoly law is based on the principle of free
competition in the market structure. This new law has not changed
Chile's traditional method of applying anti-monopoly laws. Chile's
first law dealing with restrictive practices 4 was very conventional
and fell into disuse not long after its promulgation. 5 The reasons
for lack of success with this first law foreshadow possible problems
with the new law: deeply rooted official practices of using price
control mechanisms, direct subsidies to producers, protective tar-
iffs, negative real interest credit, discriminatory exchange rates
favoring importation of primary materials and capital goods, and
cooperation between producers to "protect" themselves.'6 Chile
does allow for restriction of free competiton when it is necessary
for the stability or growth of national investment. 7
Colombia's anti-monopoly law is designed to control any re-
strictive business practice which bars free competition or causes
maintenance of unfair prices. The law describes a "dominant posi-
tion" as one where an enterprise is in a position to fix market
prices because of its size. The Colombian system is directed at
preventing dominant positions in the market when they result in
undue restriction of free competition. s
12. Law 4.137, arts. 2-4, 10 Sept. 1962; P. NaTo-CIA, BRAZIL IN WORLD LAW OF COMPLTI-
TION (1981).
13. CONSTITUICAO art. 157 (Braz. 1967).
14. Law 13.305, 6 Apr. 1959.
15. Furnish, Chilean Antitrust Law, 19 AM. J. CoMP. LAW 464 (1971).
16. Id.
17. Decree Law 2.760 (1979); Decree Law 211, arts. 2, 4 (1973).
18. Law 155, arts. 1, 4 (1959).
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Since 1915, Costa Rica has outlawed any act that restricts free
trade either occurring within the country or when an abuse of eco-
nomic power occurring in a foreign country gives rise to an effect in
the national economy. The law established that any person, natu-
ral or juridical, who sells industrial products at prices equal to, or
less than production costs will be considered as illegally mono-
polizing the particular business or industry. " This law also per-
tains to those who effectively achieve the same result but through
the offering of premiums, gifts, payments, rebates, or discounts.'
In Guatemala, the Commercial Code outlaws unfair competi-
tion. Acts of unfair competition include: deceiving or confusing the
public through false statements regarding origin or quality, or false
indications of honors or prizes; releasing false information in order
to influence purchasing decisions; and damaging another company
by imitating its products, brands, or trademarks. The code also re-
quires that a seller of a business abstain from opening a similar
enterprise which is situated such that customers might be diverted
from the sold enterprise.2 '
In Mexico the ability to fix the price of goods or services con-
stitutes market power, and is prohibited. The existence of monop-
oly is a rebuttable presumption when price-fixing, sales below cost,
or other restrictive practices are involved. When an activity exe-
cuted from a dominant position is deliberate and detrimental to
the public interest, the activity is subject to control by the State.
However, the government can authorize agreements which permit
either price fixing or production quotas.22 The anti-monopoly laws
referred to above involve a wide variety of restrictive business
practices, some of which are beyond the scope of this article. In
general, Latin American laws deal with the concentration and
merger of enterprises, monopolization, abuse of economic power,
and restrictive agreements.
III. REsTRICTIVE PRACTICES
The prominent role of the state in Latin American economies
is not the result of any deliberate plan but an example of a mixed
economy. The circumstances prompting state intervention range
19. Law 18 of 9 June 1915; Law 2468 of 13 Nov. 1959.
20. Id.
21. COMMERCIAL CODE arts. 361-62, 663.
22. CONSTITUC16N art. 28 (Mex. 1917); Organic Law of 31 Aug. 1934, arts. 3-5, 50.
1982]
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from the need to react to international economic crises, to check
foreign capital domination, to strengthen industrial growth, and to
encourage the formation of local enterprises. Most of the Latin
American countries apply such economic policy methods as price
control, control of entry into the different markets, control of ac-
tivities of production units in various sectors, participation of state
enterprises in non-traditional areas (including basic industries),
and promotion of growth of national enterprises. The administra-
tion of a national economic policy has a considerable impact on
economic relations. The access of outside competitors to domestic
markets is a principle recognized in almost all Latin American con-
stitutions, which guarantee freedom of trade and industry. How-
ever, the right to engage in economic activities is normally subject
to a number of restrictions which amount to a system of prior ap-
proval. It is mainly in the industrial sector, which is regulated by
general and sectorial laws for the promotion and protection of do-
mestic production, that the major control systems are to be found.
Today the majority of countries in the region have organic
laws for industrial promotion . 8 Such systems of laws are policy in-
struments devised by each country to carry out the import substi-
tution process. This policy includes the need to stimulate indus-
trial growth by direct incentives such as tax relief, credit facilities
or subsidies, and the protection of infant industries against foreign
competition. These laws reflect an important change in approach
towards the industrialization process and method of state interven-
tion. This change is particularly due to the recognition of the ad-
verse effects of the former industrial promotion system based on
large scale indiscriminate protection."4 The new trends in indus-
23. Argentina, Law No. 21.608 of 1977; Bolivia, Decree-law 10,045 of 1971; Supreme
Decree 12,509 of 1975 (Law of Investments); Brazil, Decree 1137 of 1970; Decree 65,106 of
1969; Consults Previa ATO Normative 32 of 1978; Chile, Decree 17, March, 1971; Decree
No. 180, 2 Feb. 1971; Consejo Nacional de Desarollo; Colombia, Decree 602, 15 Nov. 1977;
Decree 1649 20 Oct. 1977; Costa Rica, Law 5862, 9 Dec. 1975; Law No. 5162, 22 Dec. 1972;
Dominican Republic, Law No. 79, 31 Dec. 1970, Law No. 299, 23 Apr. 1968; Ecuador, Law
1414 of 1971; El Salvador, Decree-Law 279, 19 Mar. 1969 (Law of Commercial Industry),
Decree 81, 5 Sept. 1974, Decree 64, 18 Jan. 1961; Quatemala, Decree 1317, 30 Sept. 1959;
Honduras, Decree-Law 57, 30 Apr. 1958; Decree 681, 23 Oct. 1978, Decree 16, 2 April 1966,
Decree 494, April, 1960; Mexico, Industrial Promotion Law of 1955; Nicaragua, Decree 317,
20 March 1958 (Ley de Protecci6n del Desarollo Industrial); Panama, Law 92, 22 Dec. 1977;
Peru, Decree-Law 18,350 of 1971; Paraguay, Law No 216 of 1970; Uruguay, Industrial Pro-
motion Law of 1974; Venezuela, Decree 2979 and 2919 of 1979; Decree 2151, 3 Mar. 1977;
Decree 1146, 16 Sept. 1975; Decree 135, 4 June 1974.
24. Radway, Transfer of Technology to Colombia: A Proposal to Modify Decision 24,
12 LAw Am. 321, 324 (1980).
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trial promotion are not a change in approach to the existence of
dominant positions or to competition in domestic markets, but are
instead an adoption of objectives and instruments for program-
ming economic structures, and a selective and conditional applica-
tion of governmental incentives and benefits on the basis of the
efficiency and qualitative aspects of the type of production pro-
moted. Positions of dominance and monopolistic structure are not
rejected in themselves, but made subject to direct regulation by
the state.
The major consideration underlying this practical approach to
economic power is the small size of domestic markets for certain
products and the excessively large economic size of production fa-
cilities in relation to those markets which bring the objective of
competition into conflict with that of achieving maximum scales of
production. Moreover, the government's aim is to promote the
growth of domestically owned enterprises, expanding their partici-
pation in the economy to ensure that the most important
microeconomic decisions are made by local concerns. Prior ap-
proval for the establishment of new enterprises or the expansion of
the existing ones is always required. For instance, Peruvian law re-
quires prior authorization for establishment, diversification, or ex-
pansion of any industrial undertaking. Moreover, such authoriza-
tion may involve the granting of the total market in exceptional
circumstances.
In Argentina, the new law of Industrial Promotion is designed
to be a flexible instrument of national policy. The pragmatic posi-
tion of the law can go so far as to grant a monopoly of the market
to a given industry, if such industry satisfies the law's require-
ments and purposes.2 5 In other countries, the prior authorization
requirement is imposed indirectly. The emphasis of the systems
currently in force is on efficiency in industrial production through
state intervention. Government policy is based mainly on direct
control of enterprises and more or less mandatory application of
development and sectorial reorganization plans. Another character-
istic of industrial policy which has an important bearing on access
to markets is the support granted to domestic capital goods indus-
tries through legal requirements to purchase domestically made
goods, and other controls on the use of imported machinery and
equipment.
25. Law 21-608 of 1977 (statement of purposes).
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To select the investments and incentives necessary to en-
courage enterprises, some countries have established a system of
agreements between them and the government. In Latin America,
there is limited use of "competition" as a means of allocating pro-
ductive resources. The notion of competition as known in the
United States is not mentioned in the Latin American industrial
and anti-monopoly laws except in the context of improving the
ability of enterprises to compete in the international market, which
can usually be achieved, it is argued, only through the existence of
monopolies in the domestic market.2 6 Current methods of state in-
tervention clearly take the existence of dominant positions into ac-
count and are designed to prevent or eliminate abuses, or to mod-
ify the behavior of dominant enterprises by exercising direct
control over them.
A set of laws that play an important role in the regulation of
market power in Latin America are the customs laws, regulations,
and policies, price statbility laws, and monetary laws. 7 Because of
the scarcity of capital in developing countries and the need per-
ceived by their governments to direct the application of available
resources toward national planning goals, the degree of control on
capital movement is substantial. Another equally strong motiva-
tion for control is the deep desire to avoid or eradicate foreign
dominance of the local economy.
The principal connotation of the term "controls" is one of lim-
itation rather than promotion of foreign investment. Adept as
some of the Latin American countries are at "controlling" foreign
investment, there are some that consider private foreign capital an
indispensible adjunct to their own efforts to meet their economic
goals. These countries have adopted measures designed to en-
courage the migration of such capital to their economies. The limi-
tations or restraints generally employed are:
1. Outright proscription of foreign participation in a sector of
the economy or a particulr industry.
2. Limitations upon the percentage of foreign equity investment
in all concerns, or in concerns engaged in particular enterprises.
3. A requirement that the foreign investor divest himself of a
26. Schill, The Mexican and Andeaun Investment Codes: An Overview and Compari-
son, 6 L. & POL'Y IN INT'L Bus. 437, 467 (1974).
27. Brazil Law 4595, 31 Dec. 1964; Law 3244, 14 Aug. 1957; Decree 83.955 of 12 Sept.
1979; Dec. 63,196 of 29 Aug. 1968; El Salvador, Decree Law 2725 of 1958; See also ALLISON,
Capital Controls in Latin America, in INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL LAW (R. Rendell ed. 1980).
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prescribed percentage of an interest within a fixed time frame,
even though he may have initially been permitted to acquire ei-
ther 100% or a majority interest in the given enterprise.
4. Limitations upon the amount of earnings that may be remit-
ted by the foreign investor, and upon the amounts of capital
that he may withdraw from the country.
5. Limitations upon the amount of earnings that may be rein-
vested in local enterprises by the foreign investor.
Normally, when foreign exchange is required for remittance of
earnings, capital, payment of bills for imported goods and other
purposes, the foreign currency must be obtained through and ap-
proved by the nation's central bank. This requires the deposit of
local currency, sometimes on rather onerous terms such as non-
interest bearing deposits for a number of months in advance of the
actual availability of the foreign currency. Mexico, Guatemala,
Honduras, Nicaragua and Panama have been able to avoid ex-
change controls for varying but considerable periods of years. Most
of the remaining Latin American countries have a form of ex-
change control, and in some instances the system of controls is
very complex and involves several parallel foreign exchange mar-
kets using different exchange rates for different types of remit-
tances. It is characteristic of exchange control regulations in Latin
America that they are subject to relatively frequent modifications.
Restrictive business practices resulting from the conclusion of
contracts between two or more enterprises operating at the same
(horizontal) or different (vertical) level of the production process
are of special interest. The Argentine law covers horizontal agree-
ments such as price agreements, market sharing and production
limitation agreements, and vertical agreements such as exclusive
rights agreements, tied-purchasing agreements, and price fixing.
Exclusive rights agreements have only rarely been questioned
under the old legal system, and the new law has not yet been chal-
lenged. However, sales contracts prohibiting distributors from sell-
ing competing products are common in Argentina, and apparently
infringe upon the monopoly laws. Tied-sales and imposition of
sales prices have been considered as likely to create a monopoly
with the purpose of increasing profits and eliminating competi-
tion.28 Brazilian law prohibits enterprises from entering into agree-
ments if they lead to market domination. It constitutes an abuse of
the right to form an economic group to make a sale conditional
28. White, supra note 1, at 19.
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upon acceptance of an unrelated obligation, or to engage in unfair
competition. The rationale behind the Brazilian law is that such
activities prevent or prejudice freedom of decision in the market
place."'
In Chile, prices of products must be freely determined in the
market by the sole operation of supply and demand. The Chilean
courts have declared price agreements illegal. Agreements to fix
maximum prices have been sanctioned though, as they do not in-
terfere with competition, and are likely to benefit the consumer.
Decisions concerning market allocations are subject to governmen-
tal examination and control. In addition, no economic system may
be set up which tends to limit free competition by a contract to
reduce the output of any product, particularly if it meets a vital
need. The law prohibits exclusive distribution rights where a num-
ber of producers entrust the distribution of their products to a sin-
gle entitity or person. Practices which abolish discounts, agree-
ments to limit publicity, and the organization of large numbers of
producers and dealers to sell their products in accordance with
uniform rules also fall within the anti-monopoly laws.30
The ban on restrictive business practices and activities is not
absolute. Conduct must be such that it hinders free competition
before it is illegal. The conceptual problem with these laws is that
restrictive practices are not necessarily abolished even when their
effect clearly may be to impede competition. The executive power
may authorize acts or agreements otherwise illegal whenever it is
necessary to stabilize and develop domestic investment which is
threatened by foreign capital, or when the state has a public inter-
est which needs to be served.
In Latin America, the systems in force to control restrictive
business practices form an integral part of the laws regulating the
international transfer of technology, and its enforcement is en-
trusted to special governmental agencies. The various types of re-
strictive clauses are classified into categories including tie-in
clauses, price fixing, and other types of vertical arrangements. Con-
trary to the approach adopted in the antitrust legislation, the defi-
nition of conduct to be controlled is descriptive and declaratory. In
analyzing the systems for controlling restrictive clauses, it is neces-
29. Law 4.137, art. 2, 10 Sept. 1962.
30. ERNESTO OPAZO BRULL, LA CoMIsIoN ANTIMONOPOLIOS Y ESTUDIO DEL TITULO V DR
LA LEY NO. 13.305 (1962).
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sary to consider the legal frame of reference and the policy that
has developed in administrative practice. There are gaps in the
rules, as in the case of restrictions continuing after the expiration
of licensing agreements. The largest number of prohibitions and
controls relate to clauses restricting exports and to the various
types of tie-in clauses, especially those affecting the licensee's
purchases and sales. The control systems tend to use mixed meth-
ods combining both strictness and flexibility.
The principle of flexibility permits the competent agency to fix
the prices of agreements without a precise regulation on the sub-
ject. The need to correct excessive prices for foreign technology
was one of the determinative factors in the establishment of rules
regarding technology transfer in Latin America. In the majority of
Latin America countries, control has been achieved through ad-
ministrative practices. These administrative practices have estab-
lished guidelines for the percentages and ways of making payment
according to the object of the contract or the final destination of
the technology transferred.
Latin American legislation of the transfer of technology views
the regulation of "restrictive clauses" as a question of national in-
terest. In particular the goal of these laws is to avoid the negative
effects on economic policies. Furthermore, because of the imposi-
tion of such "restrictive clauses," the real control of local enter-
prises is performed from abroad. "Restrictive clauses" are defined
in Latin American law without keeping in mind the real or poten-
tial effects of such clauses on competition. Such effects on competi-
tion are not part of the definition of "restrictive clauses" in Latin
American law and are not part of their application. 1 "Restrictive
clauses" are those which can affect the productive, technological,
or commercial activities of enterprise, or those that prejudice the
economic and technological development of the nation. The control
of "restrictive practices" is formal and is performed through docu-
ments signed by the parties. The control is not determined by the
"conduct or practice" of a juridical person as it is in the U.S. and
in Europe."1 In this context, the new Argentine law on transfer of
technology"' signals a departure from the traditional Latin Ameri-
can way of dealing with "restrictive" business practices. In effect,
31. C. CoRREA, REGIMENES DE CONTROL DE LA T'RANSFERENCIA DE TECHNOLOGIA EN
AMC LATINA 41 (1979) (hereinafter cited as REGIMENES DE CONTROL].
32. Id. at 42.
33. Law 22.426 of 1981.
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according to this law, the control of such restrictive practices is
within the sole dominion of the new law on competition." This
alteration in the Argentine law is still too new to allow any
comment.
The "restrictive business clause" is viewed by Latin American
legislation more as a "vertical" restraint on commerce rather than
a "horizontal" one. None of the Latin American legislation ex-
cludes agreements between parent and subsidiary. However, be-
cause of the formal application of laws, only documents are subject
to control in the sense that these documents should not contain
objectionable restrictive business clauses. In Brazil, for instance,
the management of a subsidiary is a matter of private law that
concerns only the parent company, provided there is no "abuse" by
the controlling power."5 Clauses which limit exports are generally
prohibited with some exceptions. The Argentine provisions refer to
prohibitions on exports and clauses subjecting the right to sell to
foreign authorization. An export prohibition is valid provided that
it refers only to the markets in which the licensor produces the
goods licensed.8 6
In Mexico, the prohibition of exports in a manner contrary to
the national interest is interpreted to mean the total prohibition of
exports. Also, the obligation to export only to certain areas where
the licensor has not granted exlcusive licenses to other enterprises
is permiteed. Limitations on the volume of exports, the obligation
to pay higher royalties on exports sales, and the obligation to ex-
port exclusively through licensor channels are prohibited. 7 In Bra-
zil, the restriction or prevention of the effective use of the technol-
ogy transferred, such as marketing restrictions and especially
restrictions on exports, has been prohibited."' A declaration by the
licensee that there are no other exclusive licenses which preclude
exports is required. The legal prohibition is an instrument for ne-
gotiating more favorable positions for domestic enterprises.
Tie-in clauses usually require the licensee to perform acts
which, although not necessarily connected with the object of the
34. Law 22.262 of 1980.
35. Law 6404; Lamy, 0 Accionista Controladore a Novatei de Sociedades por Acciones,
13 REVISTA DE DIRimo ECONOmicO 61.
36. 24 INTEGRACI6N LATINDAMERICANO (1978).
37. J. ALVAREZ SOBERANIS, LA REGULACI6N DE LAS INVENCIONES Y MARCAS Y DE LA
TRANSFERENCIA TECHNOLOGICA 510, 567-70 (1979).
38. Acto Normativo 15/75.
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contract, may entail an additional financial or administrative cost
for the receipt of the technology. Tie-in provisions are illegal un-
less they are granted by the technology itself. They also can be
allowed when prices correspond to world market prices, or when
there is reasonable justification for the clause. 9 The obligation to
sell all production to the licensor or to use the licensor's distribu-
tion channels is in general prohibited.
IV. APPLICATION OF THE LAWS
The Latin American laws described aim to prevent the abuse
of dominant positions and restrictions on free competition. There
are only a limited number of provisions which prevent the forma-
tion of monopolies or allow for the dissolution of large enterprises
or group enterprises. Generally, restrictive practices are prohibited,
subject to some specific qualification before such practices are de-
clared illegal.
In Argentina, either a private individual or the government
has a cause of action to stop a restrictive business practice or to
claim damages. The National Commission for the Protection of
Competition is in charge of enforcing the anti-monopoly law, and
its actions can be either preventive or curative. This new law is
designed to apply when the equilibrium provided by competition
in the market is in danger; it acts to restore competition. This is a
significant change from the old law, which mainly pursued criminal
punishment of the transgressor. The Brazilian law is applied by
the Administrative Board for Economic Defense (CADE). CADE
determines if something is an abuse of economic power. An action
may be initiated by the accusation of either a public body or a
private person. Once enough evidence is collected, CADE may or-
der the end of the restrictive practice and also impose a fine. Fur-
thermore, all acts and agreements between enterprises are subject
to registration and prior prior approval. This system was created to
balance production against consumption in order to regulate the
market.4
39. ANDEAN PACT TECH., supra note 2, at 128-29.
40. Law 4.137 of 10 Sept. 1962.
Brazilian antitrust laws are exceptional; the principles of antitrust can be seen first in
the Brazilian Constitution of 1934. ConstituicAo art. 117 (Braz. 1934). In 1945, a law was
passed creating the Administrative Committee for the Defense of the Economy, which em-
powered the government to expropriate enterprises which might be detrimental to the na-
tional economy such as trusts and cartels. The fundamental antitrust concept was fully out-
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In Chile, restrictions on free competition are criminal offenses
punishable by imprisonment and dissolution of the guilty enter-
prises. The scope of administrative action is wide. The administra-
tive agencies in charge have the power to order the end of the re-
strictive practices and to either reform or dissolve the enterprise
found guilty. The administrative agencies also have the power to
authorize acts limiting free competition when they involve matters
of public interest."' Colombian anti-monopoly laws establish a sys-
tem in which the original prohibition is subject to either modifica-
tion or alteration. To attain this purpose, acts such as mergers are
subject to prior approval. Dominant enterprises are required to
submit information such as accounting, financial, commercial, and
technological data to the appropriate agency. That agency must
then determine the effects of such acts on the economy, and
whether such effects should be suppressed. The penalties include
fines, prohibition of activities, termination of restrictive practices,
and special governmental supervision."
Mexican law provides a total ban on monopolies and estab-
lishes a number of presumptions concerning the existence or the
possibility of a monopoly, yet there is no unified machinery to en-
force the law. Specific penalties include fines, closing the establish-
ment, fixing maximum prices, and requiring the sale of the prod-
ucts or service to the public. Price fixing is legally possible if
lined in the 1946 Constitution. It repressed abuses of economic power in the form of acts
intended to dominate the domestic market, eliminating competition and arbitrarily increas-
ing prices and profits. Constituiclo Art. 160 (Braz. 1967); Law 4.137, 10 Sept. 1962; Decree
Law 7666, 22 June 1945.
Brazilian antitrust legislation is basically interpretative. It sets forth principles rather
than specific rules, and must therefore be read in its spirit of protection of free competition
for the benefit of society in general. Brazil's laws deal with offenses allegedly committed by
companies but not by individual people, perhaps because the main penalties at the govern-
ment's disposal are intervention and possible dissolution. It is believed that fines will have
little or no effect. P. Nrro-CIA, supra note 12, at 3-17.
Recently, antitrust legislation has begun to take on more importance. According to the
law there are five basic forms of abuse of economic power. 1. The domination of domestic
markets, or partial or total elimination of competition. 2. The increase of prices without due
cause, with the intent of arbitrarily increasing profits without increasing production. 3. The
provocation of monopolistic conditions or speculation on the market to such an extent as to
temporarily increase prices. 4. The formation of an economic group by an association of
companies in order to jeopardize the freedom of action of other buyers and sellers. 5. Unfair
competition. The Brazilian antitrust laws do not consider company growth as being poten-
tially dangerous. What is suspect are multiple corporations which through their constant
growth (to giant proportions) specifically intend to bring the market under their control.
41. Decree Law 2.760 of 1973.
42. Law 155 of 1959, arts. 3, 13-14, 17.
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authorized by the government. The criterion for authorization is
the "economic efficiency" of the acts of practice involved.
The policy seeking to control market power through the ortho-
dox mechanism of antitrust legislation, as developed in the indus-
trialized countries, has not been particularly effective in Latin
America.13 The types of restrictive practices which have prompted
the rare instances of governmental intervention, and the criteria
applied and approach adopted by the appropriate authorities, do
not appear to reflect the scale of the specific form of monopolistic
patterns existing in Latin America. Given the political and eco-
nomic circumstances in Latin America, the body of anti-trust law
is small. The impairment and restrictions of competiton practiced
by larger enterprises have produced very few instances of interven-
tion, compared with the number of cases in which action has been
taken against restrictive practices which, while limiting free com-
petition, do not necessarily affect market structure or arise out of
situations marked by economic power. Rather, a substantial pro-
portion of state action is related to production activities, particu-
larly the supply of goods such as food stuffs, and patent medicines,
which are of prime social necessity. The laws apparently are used
more to directly protect the consumer by control of particular
prices, rather than as devices for controlling the functioning of the
underlying economic structures. The administrative infrastructure
responsible for applying national legal standards has not been de-
veloped to any significant degree."
The legislatures have devised systems designed to exercise
preventive control over restrictive practices either by requiring re-
gistration and prior approval of contracts, or by providing hearings
or supervisions. However, the scope and complexity of the proce-
dures provided by the laws makes it practically impossible for cur-
rent governmental agencies to put them into effect. At the same
time, except in Chile and under the new Argentine law, the control
schemes make no provision for informal negotiations with enter-
prises.' 5 One of the reasons, seldom mentioned, for this lack of ef-
fectiveness of the Latin American antitrust legislation is that the
43. Ebb, Transfer of Foreign Technology in Latin America: The Birth of Antitrust
Law? 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 719, 722 (1975); C. CORREA, REGIMENES DE CONTROL, supra note
31, at 9.
44. Comment, United States Antitrust Laws and Mexican Foreign Investment Laws:
A Comparative Survey, 13 Hous. L. REv. 571 (1976).
45. White, supra note 1, at 24-28.
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concept of a "market" is not yet developed, as it is in the United
States and Europe. In Latin America, therefore, disintegration is
the result of the existence of monopolization and restrictive busi-
ness practices.
The traditional Latin American economic problems, such as
inflation, foreign exchange, balance of payments, and unemploy-
ment, historically have not been solved by either a pure free mar-
ket economy or by a pure state run economy. Neither of these eco-
nomic theories have ever had control of the whole economy in any
Latin American country, except in Cuba. Economic programs of
fiscal responsibility, credit restrictions, a unified exchange rate,
free access to imports of capital goods and raw materials necessary
to keep wholesale prices down, and a free market competition with
price controls removed on most items have traditionally failed.
The objective of bringing economic stability through growth and a
free market pricing system has proved to be inappropriate or im-
practicable in Latin America, at least up until now.
The process of Latin American integration has changed some-
what the concept of competition. It was said that competition in
its full meaning would only be reached in the context of economic
integration. However, the history of antitrust laws in Latin
America is the story of legal measures out of time and place, ren-
dered ineffective by the force and flow of events around them. For
instance, the Mexican scheme for the regulation of monopolies and
restrictive trade practices is relatively unsophisticated and of very
limited application. While the constitution lays down broad princi-
ples for the protection of free and unrestricted competition, those
principles have been largely sacrificed in favor of what are consid-
ered more compelling economic policies and the requirements of
Mexican economic development. Some government policies have,
in fact, deliberately limited competition and fostered monopolies
by protecting domestic producers against competing imports and
even, in some cases, against the establishment of additional local
producers. Lack of competition is also an unavoidable consequence
of the realities of the Mexican economy. In many cases, the market
is simply too small to support more than a few producers. Conse-
quenlty, the existing legislation is directed more at maintaining or-
der and stability in the economy than at safeguarding competition
in a free market economy.
Despite the language of the Mexican Constitution, the law of
monopolies clearly indicates that government concern for restric-
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tive trade practices is centered on prices, and that the constitu-
tional prohibitions against protection of industry and tax excep-
tions are not to be taken too literally. It is a fundamental premise
of the law that not only should the public be protected against
excessive prices, but also that unlimited competition may be
equally harmful in that it may result in price reductions that jeop-
ardize employment and wage levels, and impede industrial devel-
opment."6 All the restrictive practices regulated by the Latin
American anti-monolopy laws may also occur in an international
economic context, with acquisition and concentration of enter-
prises, and horizontal and vertical agreements being fairly typical.
Legislation is by definition national in character; thus, acts occur-
ring abroad may be considered punishable when they produce ad-
verse effects within the country concerned. Such extraterritorial ef-
fect of the principles of jurisdiction is generally applicable to the
antitrust laws. 17 In addition, Latin American laws may be easily
construed to cover restrictive practices arising from imports or ex-
ports where these practices may produce adverse effects within the
particular country.
V. FUTURE TRENDS
In Argentina, it appears that there has been a change towards
transfer of foreign capital and technology. The purpose of the new
law on competition is to control restrictive business practices in
licensing agreements. The new law regarding practices in the trans-
fer of technology area is no longer concerned with restrictive busi-
ness practices. This change in attitude towards licensing and con-
trol of the national market could be the signal of a change in the
scope of government involvement. Economic efficiency of the mar-
ket mechanism is the current trend. Argentina's new law has been
framed, however, to avoid the vindictive attitude which character-
izes the antitrust laws. It is important to note cultural values re-
garding technical and economic progress in dealing with the en-
forcement of the law. In addition, it is necessary to determine
whether free competition has been affected by technical and eco-
nomic progress, or by the illegal actions of some participants in the
market. In this context, a capitalistic society makes perfect compe-
tition impossible. Accordingly, following the Argentinian view, per-
46. Law of 1934 (monopolies' statement of purposes).
47. Ebb, 43 FOROHAM L. REV., supra note 43, at 724.
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fect competition is no longer a model of economic efficiency.4
A similar trend can be found in Brazil, where the government
is trying to place more emphasis on the laws that concern competi-
tion and abuse of economic power. This new trend implies that
restrictive business practices in licensing agreements will be viewed
more as a matter of creating and protecting competition in the
market rather than as a matter of controlling the activities of for-
eign licensors.4 In Chile, a recent move towards enforcement of
the antitrust laws is also noticeable. 0 It is essential, however, to
keep in mind that in general the Latin American markets are not
yet developed and are, therefore, subject to imperfections and dis-
integration. In these markets, a pure economic theory based on
competition cannot operate fully. In Latin America, laws on com-
petition are relatively new, and the case law is limited or non-exis-
tent. An interest in these laws is awakening, and it is possible that
in the future they will be administered more forcefully. If this oc-
curs, the attention currently placed on restrictive business prac-
tices concerning transfer of technology will take second place.5'
The notion that efficiency, the ultimate protection for the con-
sumer, would never be fostered so long as producers responded to
factors other than competition, seems to have finally been taken
into consideration. However, the menace of an economic structure
based on price and other controls still exists. The majority of Latin
American nations operate as unitary markets, and their individual
economic potentials will not justify many production and distribu-
tion operations on the scale currently necessary for viable eco-
nomic efficiency. Moreover, if we consider the conformation of
Latin American society where the executive class is limited in
number, traditional in composition, and often related by blood and
marriage, asking for competition in such an environment may be
asking for the impossible. The executive class encourages coopera-
tion, not competition. Perhaps this is why the concept of "competi-
tion" comes to Latin America only in the form of foreign capital
and technology by companies unencumbered by the allegiances
and customs of the domestic economy. The Latin American na-
48. Christensen, 13 REVISTA DEL DERECHO, supra note 8, at 513-29.
49. P. NETo-CI^, supra note 12, at ch.2.
50. BUSINESS IN LATIN AMERICA 265, 267 (1981).
51. I.M. PAUL, DERECHO INTERNACI6NAL EcONOMIco, DERECHO DE LA INTEGRACI6N, Title




tions have taken a protective stance vis-i-vis domestic producers.
Foreign investors are permitted access to the domestic economy
only under strictly limited situations. The system of laws and offi-
cial practices is an interventionist one. More important than the
theory involved in the notion of intervention is the existence of the
bureaucracy. People learn to live within the system by various
means, including cooperation among industrialists for purposes of
dealing with the government.
There has been an increased awareness in Latin America that
the conflict between private commercial interests and the general
social and economic interests of the country as a whole has long
been regulated in the industrial world through anti-monopoly leg-
islation as well as by the establishment of public regulatory agen-
cies."2 Given this, and the fact that the laws on transfer of foreign
technology are in constant revision and change, 3 there is reason to
suspect that there will be more emphasis on anti-monopoly laws in
the future. The question that several Latin American nations will
face during the decade ahead regarding international licensing is
whether they should regulate economic problems through the use
of laws on competition, as do most countries in the industrial
world, rather than through nationalistic laws dealing with transfer
of technology.
The industrialization process will be eased only if competition
takes priority over nationalistic principles. Nationalism and pro-
tectionism are the fundamental rule in economic development in
Latin America, while competition is the rule on the international
level. If Latin American products are to compete with other prod-
ucts in the world markets, protectionism and nationalism should
be made the exceptions, and not the foundation of development.
Laws on competition should be developed and enforced in the re-
gion reversing the present trend of considering competition a sec-
ondary principle. Additionally, the rule of competition should be
equally applicable to foreigners, as well as to national concerns.
The distinction between national and foreign concerns directly
conflicts with competitive principles. If competition is not created
on the national and regional markets, the international economic
position of regional and local enterprises and their governments
52. Board of Cartagena Agreement, Policies Relating to Technology of the Countries of
the Andean Pact: Their Foundations, UNCTAD TD/107 (1971), at 126-27.
53. Law 22.426, 12 Mar. 1981 (transfer of technology); Law 22.362, 1981 (trademarks);
CONITE Res. 002-NG-81-EFC/35 (modifying rules on foreign investments).
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will always be weak. The lack of uniformity in the enforcement of
Latin American laws is the reason for their lack of success. Eco-
nomic inequalities among the Latin American countries and citi-
zens and among regional or national enterprises and foreign mul-
tinationals must be taken into account. However, principles of
segregation and protectionism can only take a secondary position
in the overall regulation of economic activity. If Latin America, as
a community of countries, is to live as a democratic society and
share the profits and responsibilities of the international commu-
nity, principles of segregation and protectionism can only be en-
forced according to areas of economic activity, and not according
to the character of the individuals, or enterprises to whom they are
applied. Equality and competition are actual foundations of a
democratic society, and they are proclaimed as such by all the
Latin American constitutions. These principles should be imple-
mented into actual legislation in order to cure the deficiency cur-
rently existing in the regulation of the Latin American economy.54
54. E. DE LA TORRE & J.M.G. LAGUARDIA, DESAROLLO HIsTToRIcI DEL CONSTITUCIONAL-
ISMO HISPANOAMERICANO (1976); EL CONTROL CONSTITUCIONAL DE LA POLIrtCA ExTERIOR EN
AMERICA LATINA (D. de Is Pedraja ed. 1973).
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